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Executive Summary 
 
Over the last 25 years there has been a rapid expansion of UK higher education with 
dramatically increasing graduate numbers. Recent research has shown that a considerable 
proportion of graduates have attained more education than is required to do their jobs. At the 
same point in time, employers continue to complain that there is a shortage of highly skilled 
labour and wage inequality has continued to widen both within as well as between narrowly 
defined educational groups. This has raised concerns about the value of higher education and 
challenges the widely held belief that a university education is a good investment and a 
guarantee of economic success.  In particular, we examine the graduate labour market in the 
UK using alumni data from one large civic university. 
There has been no complete theory on over-education in the literature - instead some 
potential explanations have been offered. Among the reasons advanced to explain over-
education are ability differences between similarly qualified workers and the career-related 
equivalence of qualifications. Since there is no formal division between career-related and 
non-career-related qualifications, it is to be expected that some education-employment 
mismatch would arise and accordingly some employees would be over-educated for the type 
of work for which they are hired.  In addition, family commitments, and labour force 
immobility may give rise to labour market rigidities that may result in over-education 
independent of the type of qualification obtained. 
The first objective of this paper is to explore the determinants of over-education. In 
particular, we examine the graduate labour market in the UK using alumni data from one 
large civic university. Independent of job characteristics or education obtained, we consider a 
range of labour market rigidities that may play an important role in the determinants of over-
education. In addition, we study the relationship between of over-education in the first and 
current job.  
Furthermore, we investigate the impact of over-education on wages. In particular we 
model the process of over-education in first and current job endogenously with the 
determination of earnings using a variety of estimation techniques (instrumental variables and 
treatment effects models).  The central conclusion of the paper is that earnings and the type of 
job a graduate enters are simultaneously determined and that simple estimation models of 
over-education (which ignore this relationship) may systematically underestimate the size of 
the negative effect of over-education on earnings. 
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Other key findings are: 
• Women are no more likely than men to be over-educated either in their first or current 
jobs. 
• Arts/humanities or languages graduates are more likely to be over-educated than 
graduates of other faculties. Higher degree results place graduates at the front of the 
queue for good jobs, with third and pass degrees moving graduates down the occupational 
ladder.  Similarly, it is an advantage to have post-graduate qualifications. 
• On-the-job experience and training have little influence on the probability of being over-
educated. In addition, graduates who were initially overeducated generally find it more 
difficult to enter graduate level jobs later.  
• Graduates bearing high financial debt commitments upon leaving university have poorer 
prospects in terms of employment-education match than their better off peers. 
• Geographical mobility plays a significant role in allocating graduates to good jobs with 
graduates who relocate more likely to find work commensurate with their educational 
qualifications. 
• There is no return whatsoever associated with surplus education in the current job. In 
other words, graduates with degrees in non-graduate jobs earn, on average, no more than 
workers with no qualifications in the same job. 
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 Introduction 
 
The numbers of graduates leaving UK higher education have steadily risen over the last 
quarter century and are continuing to rise.  In addition the trend towards rising wage 
inequality is apparent within, as well as between, narrowly defined qualification groups (see 
Machin, 1996).  Potential explanations rely on ability differences between similarly qualified 
workers and the wide divergence of human capital which individuals of the same 
qualifications may have.  At the same time as the numbers participating in higher education 
have steadily risen there have been important transformations in the types of qualifications 
being awarded by universities.  While many of these new qualifications have emerged in 
response to changing economic needs, not all of them are career related.  Since there is no 
formal division between career-related and non-career-related qualifications, it is to be 
expected that some education-employment mismatch would arise and accordingly employees 
would be over-educated for the type of work for which they are hired.  In this paper, we 
examine the effects of over-education as one possible explanation for the seemingly 
contradictory, simultaneous emergence, of both rising wage inequality and expanding 
educational participation.  In particular, we examine the graduate labour market in the UK 
using alumni data from one large civic university.  
The idea of over-education has received a lot of attention in recent discussion about 
the value of higher education.  The Economist in an article entitled “Degrees of Choice” 
highlighted that there are now about 40,000 degree courses to choose from and questioned 
the widely held belief that a university education is a good investment and a guarantee of 
economic success (see The Economist, July 15th-21st 2000 pp.34).  In particular the author 
asks “Are the degree certificates worth the paper they are printed on?”.  The concept of over-
education is not new and considerable attention has been placed on this important 
phenomenon.  Hutt (1939) suggested that waste resulting from workers being in the wrong 
jobs may be more important than that associated with unemployment in the economy.  Berg 
(1970) documented the plight of those who could not get jobs to match their qualifications 
and Freeman (1976) drew attention to the potential problem of over-investment in education.  
From these early beginnings a vast literature has evolved. 
Dolton and Vignoles (2000) and Green et al. (2000) reveal that an estimated 30% of 
UK graduates have more education than their job requires six years after graduating.  Sloane 
et al. (1999) find that 40% of graduates are over-educated six years after graduating using 
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survey carried out by the University of Birmingham.  The measure of education-employment 
mismatch we use, taken from the Newcastle Survey, extracts the actual requirements of work 
from those requirements to get the job.  Using this measure, our results suggest that 22% of 
Newcastle graduates genuinely have jobs for which a degree is not required to do the work1.  
However, 42% of graduates according to our measure held first jobs for which a degree was 
not required to do the work. 
So far there has been no complete theory on over-education in the literature - instead 
some potential explanations have been offered.2 The first objective of this paper is to 
investigate the reasons why a graduate would accept a lower-level job.  We hypothesize that 
over-education is the result of labour market rigidities, and a non-competitive environment.  
Such rigidities could arise from family commitments or labour force immobility.  We model 
over-education in first and current employment using both probit and bivariate probit 
estimation.  In the bivariate probit model the dependence between over-education in first and 
current employment is explicitly modelled.  Several reasons can be advanced to explain why 
over-education in the first job can result in over-education in the future.  For instance, over-
education could result in the deskilling of graduates or the obsolescence of skills which are 
not used.  Another factor could be, simply that, a bad start is difficult to recover from.  
Furthermore, if graduate supply is plentiful, then why should an employer hire an old 
graduate who has been in a job beneath him rather than a new graduate straight from 
university? 
The second objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of over-education on 
wages.  Previous research (Sloane et al., 1999; Green et al., 2000 and Dolton and Vignoles, 
2000) has assumed that mismatch in the labour market is essentially a random phenomenon.  
In addition, we make an important contribution to the literature by examining the issue of 
bias in the OLS estimate of over-education.  “Ability” bias may arise in the presence of 
unobserved factors, which are correlated with over-education and yet also correlated with 
wages, and result in an upward coefficient in the OLS estimate.  OLS estimates may be 
subject to discount-rate bias arising from graduates with higher discount rates choosing jobs 
for which less education is required3.  On the one hand, OLS provides an estimate of the pay 
                                                           
1 The numbers of recorded individuals who are classified in our sample as over-education is less than is reported 
by National-wide studies.  This is because the Newcastle Alumni Survey has a disproportionate number of 
graduates who go into teaching from university and the survey contains graduates from as far back as 1970 (who 
are less likely to be over-educated).   
2 Sicherman and Galor (1990) have a partial theory of occupational ladders but no complete theory of over-
education. 
3 Individuals with high discount rates require a job immediately. 
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penalty associated with over-education on average.  On the other hand, using variables that 
affect over-education but not wages, IV estimation provides an estimate of the pay penalty 
for marginal graduates with high discount rates.  Hence we expect that OLS estimates 
understate (i.e. less negative) the true causal effect of over-education on wages.  We deal with 
the endogeneity issue by exploiting the natural variation in the data generated by exogenous 
influences on the matching outcome.  More precisely, we rely on the exogenous changes in 
the over-education distribution of graduates caused by labour market rigidities to provide 
instruments for over-education.  In addition to the IV approach, we also estimate a treatment 
effects model which allows for the endogeneity of over-education.  In current employment, 
our IV estimates of the over-education effect are treble those found using OLS 4.  
This paper is set out as follows.  The next section places over-education in the context 
of its theoretical framework and discusses possible explanations for the phenomenon.  
Section 3 outlines our estimation methods.  Section 4 describes the Newcastle Alumni Survey 
and presents some descriptive statistics.  Section 5 provides estimates of the factors affecting 
the probability of over-education and the implications it has on wages.  Section 6 concludes 
the paper. 
 
 
2.  Theoretical Framework and Measurement Issues 
 
In the literature there are three ways in which over-education (or over-skill) has been 
measured.  The first, we label, the “external assessment” measure.  This method depends on 
systematic evaluation by expert job analysts who judge the level and type of education 
required for particular occupations.  For instance Rumberger (1987) used the U.S. Dictionary 
of Occupational Titles (DOT) (U.S. Department of Labour, 1965) which provided 
information on the educational requirements of a range of occupations.  Spenner (1983, 1988) 
and Wolff (2000) also relied on comparisons between the skill requirements for the 
individual’s occupation that are recorded in various editions of the DOT.  There are few 
European equivalents to DOT, one is the ARBI code, developed by the Dutch Department of 
Social Affairs (see Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988).  Job complexity is separated into seven 
levels where both job content and the level of ability and knowledge required are taken into 
account.  
                                                           
4 One can place a discount rate interpretation on the educational choice decision in the manner suggested by 
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The second approach, which we shall call the “statistical” method, was developed by 
Verdugo and Verdugo (1989).  This approach uses the distribution of educational 
qualifications in a given occupation.  Most commonly, over-education is defined as a level of 
education one standard deviation or more above the mean for the occupation, or under-
education as a level one or more standard deviations below the mean5.  Instead of using the 
mean, some authors use the modal education level within an occupation to determine whether 
somone is over-educated (see Kiker et al., 1997 and Alpin et al., 1997)6.  
The third approach we term the “self-assessment” technique or a subjective 
assessment.  Using this approach survey respondents are asked directly the minimum 
educational requirements necessary to perform their jobs7.  Following most other authors, we 
use this technique. 
Each of these methods have their limitations and their use can lead to different results.  
Firstly, while the job analyst approach has the advantage of being objective, it ignores the 
fact there is likely to be a distribution of required education within the same occupational 
titles because various different skill jobs are grouped together.  Consequently, 
misclassification of workers into over-education may occur.  Also, required schooling may 
vary according to the individuals level of ability, experience and tenure.  If education and 
ability are substitutes, then an individual with higher ability may require less schooling to 
perform at their work.  Furthermore, levels of education dummies ignore the type of 
education received and therefore some workers who are recorded as mismatched are in fact 
incorrectly classified.  Most importantly these studies often use data where the educational 
requirements of jobs do not change over time.  This is in substantial part a result of the cost of 
and time taken to use the “external assessment” method.  As a result, occupational 
classifications often become available long after they have been measured and are typically 
used for a very long period of time, therefore they assume no change in job content.  
However, the optimal level of skill depends on market forces (Borghans and de Grip, 2000).  
Technological and organisational developments may change the requirements.  It is therefore 
not surprising that the objective method tends to provide high levels of over-education (or 
over-skill) and high increases in these levels over time. 
The ‘statistical’ definition of over-education uses the theoretical foundation of the 
allocation theory to measure the extent of mismatch.  If the labour market is working well, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Cameron and Heckman (1998) 
5 See for example: Asplund and Liji (2000), Sloane et al, (2000). 
6 The modal level, is the level of education that occurs most often in a distribution of occupation. 
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may be expected that the majority of workers within a certain occupation have the 
appropriate educational backgrounds.  This approach has the advantage that it is sensitive to 
labour market developments and technological change.  However, labour market rigidities 
such as labour force agreements impede the effectiveness of this method.  If it is based on 
new labour market entrants this approach may be very responsive.  Furthermore, the 
empirical approach allows for a range of education levels within occupations.  Albeit, the 
demarcation line between appropriate and inappropriate levels of education are arbitrary.  
Also, by definition it will always describe a certain proportion of people in an occupation as 
over-education (and by symmetry under-educated) irrespective of the underlying excess 
demand or supply of skills. 
The method we use, based on worker’s self-assessment may be biased because it is 
subjective, and workers may find it difficult to categorise their work into the actual level of 
education required.  Consequently, some authors argue that workers may rely on the actual 
requirements to get their job rather than on the actual requirements necessary to do the job.  
Therefore, credential creep may be understated in studies that use this method.  Initially, 
perhaps workers are unaware of the skills required to do their job and reply on the actual 
requirements to get their job.  However, where workers have been in their jobs for sometime 
they are better able to assess the skill requirements to do their job.  Stasz (1998) found that 
employees reported the actual skill requirements of their jobs much more accurately than 
employers.  Unlike the job analysis model, rather than being generally classified into 
occupational categories, employees are able to identify their individual jobs.  Also, this 
method allows workers to report changes in job content each time the survey is carried out or 
at different points in their careers.  
There are also some significant conceptual problems associated with the concept of 
over-education.  The exact definition of the term itself often depends on the assumptions 
made by the author.  Most researchers have defined individuals as being over-educated if 
he/she has more education than is required to do his/her job, regardless of the wage earned.  
According to pure human capital theory, an individual’s earnings are a function of acquired 
education as job characteristics are assumed to be able to take advantage of the higher level 
of human capital of graduates and individuals are paid their marginal productivity (Becker, 
1975).  Human capital theory would suggest that firms and employees are assumed to fully 
utilise their human capital and the concept of over-education is meaningless and should not 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7 See for instance: Duncan and Hoffman, (1981); Green et al.,. (2000) Sicherman (1991); Sloane et al.,. (1999). 
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be included as an explanatory variable in the earnings function.  Even in the context of 
human capital theory, society may over- or under-invest in education.  This would result in an 
outward shift in the supply of qualified labour and correspondingly a reduction in the returns 
(wages) to qualifications, holding demand for education constant.  
Within the framework of human capital theory, individuals may be permanently as 
well as temporarily in jobs that under-utilise their education.  Disequilibrium in the labour 
market generated by restrictive work practices or some other form of labour market rigidities, 
may hinder firms from fully utilising every individual’s education and paying them the value 
of the their potential marginal product.  Where a graduate earns less than he/she would if they 
were employed in a graduate level job, we term him/her as being over-educated.  Before 
examining the possible explanations of why individuals may choose to accept a job beneath 
their qualifications, it is instructive to examine movements in and out of various employment-
education positions over time using data from the Newcastle Alumni Survey.  
Table 1 presents the transition matrix between first and current employment-education 
matches.  Employees are defined in terms of the education requirements of their jobs.  All 
individuals in our sample at least have obtained a degree.  The diagonal elements of the table 
show the number of graduates who remain in the same position in the two periods.  The other 
positions in the table show the numbers who move into higher or lower level jobs. 
Looking at graduates who move from higher to lower level jobs, we see that there is 
considerable downward occupational mobility.  Of our total only about 10% of graduates 
move down the occupation distribution into lower level jobs.  However, of the 552 
individuals who enter graduate or postgraduate jobs initially, 15% switch out of these jobs 
into lower-level occupations.  Also, 8.4% of graduates initially in sub-degree level 
employment move down into lower level jobs later.  Moving in this downward direction 
across the matrix of transitions i.e. from left to right, may be the result of labour market 
rigidities such as family commitments and labour immobility; or imperfect information. 
Looking at the diagonal of the table, we see that 49% of graduates are in the same 
level job now as when they first joined the work force.  But 15% of these graduates have 
never held a degree level job at all. 
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To understand the determinants of over-education and movements along the transition 
matrix it is important to understand how over-education could arise and persist.  Individuals 
may be temporarily or permanently in jobs where their skills or education are under-utilised 
and accordingly may not receive their potential marginal product.  It is this phenomenon that 
is over-education.  An over-educated worker earns less than a similarly educated worker 
whose skills are fully utilised.  Accordingly, the crucial questions are:  (1) Why a worker 
would take up such a job?  (2) Why a firm would not utilise the entire endowment of its 
workers’ human capital?  We examine several possible explanations.  
Consider the role that the employer plays in the matching process.  Some researchers 
question whether firms can easily adapt their production technologies to fully utilise the 
human capital this is available to them (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981; Hartog and Oosterbeek, 
1988; Rumberger, 1987).  If some firms cannot change their production methods to take 
advantage of the supply of human capital available, then an individual’s productivity and 
hence their earnings may be less than they would receive elsewhere.  In the long run we 
would expect firms to find ways of fully utilising all the skills of their employees and 
accordingly over-education would only be a short-term problem.  However, over-education 
may also be a long-run problem. 
Firms may place a great deal of emphasis on the subject of study and area of 
specialisation, and therefore focus on only a narrow segment of the graduate population.  
Graduates in some disciplines may find themselves over-educated as a result of the lack of 
additional qualifications necessary to utilise initial education.  For example law and 
accountancy graduates may require a professional or vocational qualification in addition to a 
relevant university degree to find work commensurate with their qualifications. 
Many characteristics including unmeasured attitudes toward work and innate ability 
may vary by class of degree.  The signalling models of the role of education due to Spence 
(1973) suggest that part of the function of education is to differentiate between workers of 
differing innate ability.  The basic model suggests that the cost of education must be lower 
for higher ability graduates.  Therefore, if ability is positively correlated with class of degree, 
then firms may favour workers with higher degree classes. 
Firm size may have an important bearing on the match between work and education 
for several reasons.  Larger firms may have more sophisticated recruitment structures and a 
wider range of jobs, which may decrease the probability of the under-utilisation of skills and 
education-employment mismatch.  
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Labour market institutions, such as trade unions, may restrict work practices, thereby 
generating labour market rigidities and a non-competitive environment.  These labour market 
rigidities may limit the firm’s ability to reward more able staff.  Trade unions are more likely 
to be present in larger firms rather than smaller firms. 
On the one hand, graduates who work in the public sectors may be more likely to be 
over-educated as a result of the less competitive nature of the labour market in that sector.  
But on the other hand, there are many jobs in the public sector which are available only to 
graduates e.g. teaching.   
Part-time and temporary work could increase the likelihood of being over-educated.  
Part-time jobs might make it difficult to fully use all forms of human capital including 
qualifications attained.  Temporary work may offer a “quick fix” rather than a permanent life-
long career.   
Employees are also responsible for creating a good match.  Notwithstanding 
educational achievements and innate ability, several personal factors may influence the 
employment-education outcome.  For instance, family commitments, financial debt, 
disabilities and the willingness to relocate to regions where more graduate jobs are available 
may have an important influence on the probability of finding appropriate employment.  We 
will briefly discuss the likely impact that each of these factors may have on the probability of 
being over-educated. 
First, family commitments may result in better matches for men as they may make 
more of an effort to get better jobs to financially support their families.  The greater 
responsibility which women usually bear for the daily care of their children may make it 
more difficult for women to find work commensurate with their qualifications.  In particular 
family commitments early in life may have a greater influence on over-education than family 
commitments later.  For instance, graduates who have had children prior to their first job may 
find it more necessary to get some or any job and not necessarily a graduate-level job.  This is 
because there is likely to be a higher trade off between search costs and current consumption 
requirements for graduates with children than without children when first entering the labour 
market. 
Marital status may also have an impact on the probability of being over-educated.  A 
married graduate may be limited in his/her ability to find appropriate work in consideration 
for his/her partner.  For instance, a married graduate may relocate because of their partner’s 
job regardless of whether they themselves can find work in the region commensurate with 
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their qualifications.  There are also other reasons (perhaps mostly personal) why graduates 
may wish not to relocate to find suitable employment. 
Second, health problems may make it difficult for some graduates to find graduate-
level jobs.  For instance, disabled individuals may face difficulties in finding work and 
making a good job match.  However, individuals who are disabled may be well matched as a 
result of government legislation governing the employment of the disabled in the public 
sector.  It is also possible that disabled graduates who work may be very determined 
individuals and therefore would find good matches independent of government quotas. 
Third, debts incurred while studying may impact on the probability of being over-
educated later.  The repayment of debts may place an incentive to search harder to find 
employment that generates the greatest return to education.  It is also very likely that banks 
have more of an incentive to provide loans to students on career-related programmes.  
Through this selection mechanism we may find that graduates with debts are less likely to be 
over-educated.  But, high debt commitments may place more of an onus on early graduates to 
find some immediate work thereby often generating poor matches.  Also, individuals from 
less-privileged backgrounds (usually less well connected) are more likely to take out loans to 
go to university.  Thereby the effect of debt commitments may be difficult to disentangle 
from family background influences if we do not control for both in regression analysis.  The 
Newcastle Survey has information on whether or not an individual received a state grant to 
help finance their education.  We use this information to proxy family financial 
circumstances and socio-economic status. 
Early labour market choices may also affect the fit between education and 
employment in the future.  The accumulation of other forms of human capital necessary to 
work in a graduate job may take some time after graduation.  For that reason, experience, 
tenure and training could improve many graduates’ prospects in the future.  Alba-Ramirez 
(1993) found evidence to suggest that the overeducated have less human capital such as work 
experience and training.  Similarly, many individuals starting in low-level jobs may, in time, 
be promoted to better ones.  However, promotion could be endogenous since individuals who 
are well matched may be the ones more likely to have been promoted.  Therefore, promotion 
is not included in our final analysis.  
Over-education may be caused by imperfect information where graduates end up in 
non-graduate jobs because they lack information about the educational status of jobs.  If there 
is a difference between the qualifications required for entry to work and the qualifications 
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required to actually do the work, which may only be known sometime after starting, then 
many graduates may be over-educated for this reason.  
Also, there are business-cycle effects, and cohort effects.  First, graduates may 
respond to high national (or regional) unemployment by taking jobs in less educationally 
intensive occupations.  If hysteresis effects were not generated by downward occupation 
mobility, over-education would be merely a short-term problem.  However, if new graduates 
enter the labour market during a period of economic decline and take non-graduate jobs many 
may find it difficult to recover from this bad start to their careers.  
The probability that any individual is over-educated may be partially the result of 
changes in the education system.  In recent years as the numbers of graduates has grown the 
breadth of degrees has expanded.  This could result in a widening in quality and career-
orientation of university qualifications or a shift in the ability composition of graduates.  A 
greater variation in the quality of qualifications could be due to a widening in the range of 
degree programmes.  A change in the composition of graduates, in terms of their innate 
ability or family backgrounds, could be the result of lower entry costs to university.  
Subsequently, not only have the types of qualifications changed over time but the distribution 
of skills they represented has also changed.  In addition, the extent to which learned skilled 
can be transferred to the labour market varies markedly with type of degree and the 
specialisation component of qualifications.  As a result of these changes, university graduates 
may be taking jobs (requiring less than a university degree) that they would not have in the 
past. 
Qualification inflation may also generate downward occupational mobility.  
According to (educational) signalling models part of the function of qualifications is to 
identify workers of different innate ability.  As the numbers in education increase, the 
distribution of ability that qualifications represent may expand, and accordingly the validity 
of qualifications as a proxy for innate ability may decrease.  In response, firms may raise the 
qualification requirements of work in order to ensure the recruitment of the most able 
graduates.  If the educational content of job remains unchanged the net result is qualification 
inflation i.e. the devaluation of qualifications and a rise in over-education. 
Many of the above factors may give rise to labour market rigidities that limit the  
capacity of the market to fully utilise and reward highly educated employees.  The Newcastle 
Alumni Survey contains a considerable amount of information on individual labour market 
choices, family circumstances and personal commitments, which can give rise to labour 
market rigidities that generate employment-education mismatch.  In our empirical analysis 
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we look at these potential determinants and focus only on those characteristics that have an 
important bearing on the match between workers and jobs.  Accordingly, our models below 
only include important variables as established by our data.  Before describing to our results, 
we will formally outline the estimation method used and present some descriptive statistics of 
important variables. 
 
 
3.  Estimation Methods 
 
The first objective of this paper is to investigate the validity of the above explanations in the 
context of the determinants of over-education.  The second objective is to examine the 
relationship between over-education and labour market earnings.  A number of different 
model specifications are used to address both these issues.  
The over-education literature to date has assumed that mismatch in the labour market 
is essentially an exogenous phenomenon, and has relied on the following reduced-form wage 
function to measure the relationship between over-education and wages: 
 
iikiki SXy µβββ +++= 210ln  (1) 
 
Where S is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the person is in a job for which 
they are over qualified.  More recently Sloane et al. (1999) have modelled over-education at 
initial labour market state (j=1) and at some date afterwards (j=2).  They have however still 
assumed that the over-education process is exogenously determined.  Hence their model 
involves estimating two equations: 
 
2,1,ln 210 =+++= jSXy ji
j
ijkjikjjji µβββ  (2) 
where Sj for j=1,2 is a measure of skill under-utilization in first and current employment.  X 
is a vector of other characteristics.  Henceforth, we will drop the individual i subscript 
notation.  Estimates of equation (1) or (2) by OLS will yield unbiased estimates of β2 only if 
over-education (or skill under-utilization) is exogenous i.e. E(Sµ) =0.  This will arise if 
conditioning on the observable variables (X) is sufficient to control for the endogenous 
choice of over-education.  Our first wage specification assumes that individuals who have the 
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same observable X, but who have different values for over-education, do not differ, on 
average, in the unobserved error term, µ, that is: 
 
However, over-education may be endogenous if family commitments and labour 
market rigidities, for instance, are significant determinants.  In this case, over-education will 
be systematically greater for individuals with family commitments and working in non-
competitive labour markets.  Accordingly, part of the estimate on over-education may be 
picking up these factors.  A standard solution to the problem of causal inference is 
instrumental variables (IV) where we posit the existence of an observed covariate that is a 
determinant of over-education but is uncorrelated with wages.  Thus our alternative model 
structure, involves estimating the following over-education probit equation endogenously 
with the wage equation: 
 
2,1, =+= jZS jjj
j εα  (3) 
 
where S j is a measure of skill under-utilization, and Z is a vector of characteristics that are 
thought to determine over-education.  Predicted values of S j from equation (3) are then 
entered in place of the actual values in equation (2). 
Alternatively, if over-educated workers are less able in some way they may lack some 
of the abilities/skills required to do a job that is normally commensurate with their level of 
education.  This would imply that the over-educated are not genuinely over-educated.  Rather 
they have jobs that are appropriately matched with their abilities8.  In other words, the over-
educated are a non-random sample from the population and therefore receive lower wages 
than appropriately educated individuals.  We therefore use an alternative wage specification 
(i.e. specification III), based on a model of treatment effects, to deal with this issue.  This is 
an extension of the Heckman (1979, 1990) selection model, whereby all observations in the 
sample are included (i.e. both over-education and appropriately educated workers are 
included).  Again equation 3 is estimated using a probit model and the parameter estimates 
are used to compute the Heckman (1979) selection adjustment term, λ.  Along with the actual 
values for over-education λ is entered into the wage equation as follows: 
                                                           
8 Green et al., (1999) using the NCDS find some support for this argument. 
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2,1,ln 210 =++++= jSXy jjj
j
jkjkjjj µλθβββ  (4) 
 
As already mentioned identification, in the IV model, or in the alternative selectivity 
model is provided by including variables in Z that are not elements of X.  Our model 
identification is achieved by the inclusion of dummy variables in the set Z that generate 
labour market rigidities.  
Finally, if over-education in current employment and first employment are correlated 
then the following model, which explicitly estimates the process of over-education over time, 
may be written: 
 
 
S j = 1 if S  j* > 0, S j =0 otherwise. 
 
[ε1 , ε2] ~ bivariate normal[0,0,1,1,ρ] 
 
 
S j* is the latent variable corresponding to S j and we treat this as a bivariate probit rather than 
a simple probit.  Estimation by an individual single equation probit method would be 
inefficient because it ignores the correlation between the disturbances.  
From the above bivariate model, we can replicate wage specification III, which deals 
with sample selectivity in the form of treatment model effects, as follows: 
 
µλθλθββββ ++++++= 22112312102ln SSXy  (5) 
where y2 is wages in current employment,   λ1 and  λ2 are generated from the bivariate probit 
model above.  This is our fourth wage specification. 
The λ variables in the regression are: 
 
 
2,1,* =+= jZS jjj
j εα
[ ] 21122*1 ,| ρλα += ZZSSE
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 22/1212112211 /1/ Φ−−Φ= ρρφλ www
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For the case where S1=S2=1 
 
 
And the bivariate normal CDF is 
 
 
To get the other cases, just change the sign of w1 when S1=0, w2 when S2=0, and ρ when 
S1≠S2.   
 
 
4.  Data and Variables 
 
This paper uses data from the Newcastle Alumni Survey.  This data was collected at the 
University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne in 19989.  This survey was undertaken in order to permit 
the analysis of over-education in the graduate labour market.  Accordingly the questionnaire 
included questions on the factors that are perceived to have an impact on the employment-
education match.  This information was supported by the collection of background 
information on graduates including their personal characteristics, educational achievements 
and employment histories. 
The sample for this survey was selected using the Newcastle University Alumni 
Database of graduates and postgraduates.  At the time the survey was carried out, 43,099 
alumni were in this database.  However, only 3,187 indicated their interest in participating in 
“careers research” and were posted the questionnaire.  Overall, 2434 members returned the 
questionnaire, most of whom had graduated in the 1990s.  This represents 76.37% response 
rate.  Although a generally satisfactory response rate had been achieved, anything less than a 
perfect response raises the question of whether those who were assessed were representative 
                                                           
9 This survey was funded by the Economics Department and  the Alumni Office at the University of Newcastle-
upon-Tyne, and the Government Office North East.  
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of the university alumni population.  The main causes of non-response are unknown because 
the survey was posted and no other contact was made.  
This marked under-representation of those who graduated prior to 1990 may be due to 
two factors.  Firstly, the University only started keeping electronic records of graduates in 
1983.  As a consequence, there were thousands of alumni who have never been on the 
University Alumni Database.  Secondly, prior to 1991 the Alumni Association was a fee-
paying society, and graduates “opted in” rather than “opted out” as is now the case.  The 
Alumni Association had about 3,000 members in 1991; today it has over 49,000.  It is 
difficult to know if those who opted not to join prior to 1991 were a non-random sample of 
graduates as many would have not known about the Alumni Association.  If our sample is 
non-random then analysis will suffer from sample selection bias.  
The final sample is comprised of 2,434 graduates, for which there is reasonably 
consistent data for 2,348 individuals.  Since we are only interested in the UK labour market 
our sample excludes all individuals living abroad during either their first or current job (i.e. 
343 persons).  In addition, we drop graduates from the faculty of medicine (i.e. 232 persons) 
and individuals who graduated before 1970 (i.e. 220 persons) since they are unlikely to be 
over-educated.  Finally, we only focus on individuals who are currently in employment at the 
time of the survey.  This leaves us with a final sample of 1,389 graduates, of which our 
estimation samples are 852 and 731.  We lose a significant number of observations due to 
missing data.  Not withstanding the potential of sample selection bias into the original 
sample, we generated sample weights based on our samples of 852 and 731 persons, in order 
to take account of the uneven distribution of responses across years.  All descriptive statistics 
and regression analysis was performed using these weights.  Summary statistics for 
individuals in our sample are provided in Table 1A of Appendix A. 
The Newcastle Alumni Survey has a wealth of information on educational 
achievements.  In order to examine factors such as pre-university schooling, questions were 
asked about school type, qualifications acquired to gain entry to the University, and details of 
subjects and grades achieved where A-levels or Scottish SCE ‘Higher Grade’ were the 
examinations taken.  Individuals were asked questions about the faculty or department, the 
class of degree, whether they received a maintenance grant (partial or full) and/or the amount 
of bank over-draft they had upon leaving Newcastle University.  Also, graduates were asked 
whether their course was sponsored by a company or employer organisation.  Furthermore, 
information was gathered about qualifications (academic, professional, or vocational) 
 16
obtained since leaving Newcastle.  The survey records the starting and finishing dates and 
subjects of all qualifications obtained. 
Graduates were asked to provide information on their employment status at five 
specific time intervals:  6 months after graduation, 1986, 1991, 1996, and at the time of the 
survey.  Furthermore, detailed labour market information about their current or most recent 
job, previous job and first job upon completion of first degree from Newcastle University was 
provided by the survey. 
Most importantly, this is the only British dataset that contains two direct questions 
measuring the extent of qualification mismatch or over-education.  The first question is:  
“What is/was the minimum formal qualification level required for entering this job?” and the 
second question is:  “What do you believe to be the education level required to actually do 
this job?”.  Answers to both questions are on a four-point scale as follows:  post-graduate 
qualification, degree, sub-degree qualification, and no qualifications required.  The first 
question provides a match between acquired and required qualifications to get one’s job, 
whereas the second question provides a direct measure of over-education in terms of job 
content.  Contrasting information between both questions provides a measure of qualification 
inflation.  Qualification inflation arises where the educational requirements to get a job 
exceed the educational requirements to do the job effectively.  Table 1C in Appendix C, 
illustrates the level of qualification apparent in our data.  
Table 2 displays the distribution of qualifications required to actually do current and 
first jobs.  The table shows that there is considerable movement over time into graduate level 
employment.  Just over 78% of graduates are currently in jobs that require a degree to 
actually do the work, while over 58% held a first job that required a degree.  15% of our 
sample believe that their current jobs require a sub-degree whereas the corresponding figure 
for first jobs is 20%.  Now 6% of graduates claim that their current jobs require no 
qualification at all but almost 22% believed that their first job was at this level.  With respect 
to a degree, the data suggests that 22% of graduates are currently over-educated for their jobs, 
and 42% were over-qualified for their first job.  In Appendix C, Table 2C presents the 
incidence of over-education by different categories of graduates. 
Table 3 sheds further light on over-education by providing information about the 
qualifications required for entering employment.  In terms of the requirements for current 
jobs, 78% of graduates required a degree – the same proportion that believed a degree was 
necessary to do the work.  By contrast, while 67% of graduates needed a degree to get their 
first job only 58% believe that a degree was necessary to actually do the work.  
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5.  The Results  
 
5.1  The determinants of over-education  
 
We begin by looking at the determinants of over-education in the first job and the current job 
where over-education is estimated by probit.  These results are reported in Table 410.  Over-
education is measured with respect to a degree, therefore, there is no distinction made 
between graduate and post-graduate qualifications.  Our specifications control for several 
categorical variables that influence the probability of over-education:  faculty of degree; class 
of degree; post-university qualifications; part-time and self-employment; sector; firm size; 
occupation; labour market mobility; family commitments; debt commitments; cohort effects; 
years of actual experience as well as age; on-the-job training; and a dummy variable for over-
education in the first job is added to the probit for over-education in the most recent job. 
Before turning to our main results, it is important to note that we examined the 
relationship between each of the variables mentioned in Section 2 as potential explanations in 
the match between education and work.  Each of these variables were included in the 
equations as potential determinants of over-education, however, only those mentioned in the 
tables were statistically significant.   
Table 4 displays the results from the estimation of probit equations on the probability 
of being over-educated in first and current employment separately.  Specification 1 reports 
the marginal effects and the corresponding standard errors for first employment, 
specifications II and III for current employment where specification III includes a dummy 
variable for education-employment match in first employment11.  
One of the most important results from our research is that over-education is not 
contingent upon gender.  We find that women are no more likely than men to be over-
educated either in their first or current jobs.  This indicates that women are not given lower-
level jobs simply because they are women.  Therefore, according to our analysis, hiring 
practices for graduate level jobs, on average, are not subject to discrimination and provide 
equal opportunities in Great Britain.  This is in line with the literature on technological 
                                                           
10 Throughout the tables a single asterisk means that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level on a two-
tailed test (i.e. the t-statistic is greater than 1.64) and two asterisks that the coefficient is significant at the 5% 
level on a two-tailed test (i.e. the t-statistic is greater than 1.96).  
 
11 Table 1B in Appendix B displays the corresponding coefficient and standard errors.   
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change, which asserts that new technological change has created a demand for women’s as 
well as men’s education. 
Faculty of degree is an important determinant of over-education.  With respect to first 
employment, graduates in education are substantially more likely to find employment 
commensurate with their qualifications than those who graduate from other faculties.  
Regarding current employment, graduates in arts and humanities, and in languages are more 
likely to be over-educated than other graduates.  These results are wholly consistent with the 
view that graduates with less vocationally-oriented qualifications are more likely to be 
overqualified that those with qualifications which are vocationally-oriented.   
In terms of degree class, individuals who graduated with first class honours are more 
likely to find first jobs for which a degree is required to do the work.  By contrast, graduates 
with third or pass degrees are more likely to be in current jobs that do not require a degree at 
all.  This would seem to indicate that good grades place individuals at the front of the queue 
for good jobs regardless of which subject of study they undertook at university.   
Our results seem to suggest that undertaking postgraduate qualifications increase the 
probability of being in a graduate level job.  Initially, we see that having a higher degree does 
not increase the likelihood of having a graduate job in comparison with a first degree.  
However, post-graduates are more likely to hold current jobs for which a degree is required to 
do the work.  In contrast, although the coefficients are negative, professional qualifications 
obtained after leaving Newcastle University do not significantly increase the probability of 
finding graduate level employment either in first or current employment.  However, we find 
that graduates in professional occupations or in the self-regulating professional sector more 
likely to be in graduate jobs than those in the comparison groups, respectively.    
The probability of over-education is likely to depend on several employment 
characteristics.  Graduates who are currently employed on a part-time basis are more likely to 
be overqualified than those employed on a full-time basis.  This may be because graduates 
who wish to work on a part-time basis may be more constrained in their choice of jobs if 
employers cannot provide that many graduate-level jobs on a part-time basis.  It is interesting 
that in initial employment part-time status is not statistically significant.   
We find that self-employment status has no discernible impact on the probability of 
being over-educated.  Occupation classification plays one of the most important roles in 
determining the probability of being over-educated.  The default category is made up of 
clerical occupations, manufacturing crafts, personal and protective services, sales, plant and 
machine operatives, and other occupations.  In comparison with the default category, 
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professionals are 42% less likely to be over-educated in their first jobs, and between 15-20% 
in their current jobs.  Similarly in comparison with the default group, associate professionals 
are 28% less likely to be over-educated in the first job and between 6-8% in the current job.   
Managerial status is not statistically significant in first employment but by current 
employment managers are about 9% less likely to be over-educated than the default group.  
The fact that managerial status is not always consistently related with a graduate being in a 
graduate level job may in part be due to the fact that the managerial classification 
encompasses a wider range of skills or qualifications than the professional or associate 
professional categories. 
By comparison with the default group, in first and current employment, graduates 
working in either the self-regulating professional sector or the education sector are less likely 
to be over-educated.  This result is unsurprising since the majority of graduates in education 
are teachers and those in the self-regulating professional sector usually require a degree such 
as in accounting.  In addition, our results suggest that over-education is not more prevalent in 
the public sector due to the less competitive nature of the labour market.  Furthermore, 
graduates in small firms with less than 25 employees are less likely to hold jobs 
commensurate with their education and skills.  As well as having more opportunities for 
graduates, larger firms may also have human resource functions that match workers to jobs, 
therefore creating better education-employment matches.   
Looking at the relationship between on-the-job experience variables and current over-
education we see that only experience squared is statistically significant, but it is numerically 
trivial with a coefficient of only .001.  Unemployment and age are not statistically significant.  
It is interesting to note that employer provided training has no measurable affect on the 
probability of being over-educated.  These results seem to suggest that over-education is 
generally a permanent rather than a temporary phenomenon.  In addition, looking at 
specification III and the impact of over-education in the first job on the probability of being 
over-educated in the current job, we find strong support for this view.  Graduates who are 
over-educated at the start of their careers will find it more difficult to get graduate jobs later 
in comparison with graduate initially in jobs for which a degree is required.   
Next let us examine the instrumental variables used in our analysis, which are as 
follows:  labour market mobility, family commitments, and debt commitments.  These factors 
have an important bearing on over-education but are not correlated with wages.   
Regional mobility plays one of the most important roles in allocating graduates to 
good jobs.  Relocating to take a first job increases the probability of being well matched by 
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22%, whereas relocating to take a current job increases the probability by about 7%.   
Interacting mobility and gender, we see that women who relocate for their first job are 19% 
more likely to be in graduate level employment compared to women who don’t relocate for 
their first jobs, however, the coefficient is only statistically significant at the 10% level of 
significance.  With respect to current employment, women who relocate are between 10-13% 
better off by comparison with women who don’t relocate, and this interaction term is 
statistically significant at the 5% level.   
Looking at family commitment variables, with respect to first employment, children 
prior to first job significantly (at the 10% level) improves the probability of finding a 
graduate job.  This clearly reflects the greater responsibility young parents (and particularly 
young male graduates) bear and therefore a greater need to get the highest possible return on 
their education.  In contrast, having a partner prior to first job makes no discernible impact on 
the probability of being over-educated in first employment.  In our specifications for current 
employment, we condition on the presence of children at any time rather than on children 
prior to first job.  Our results show that children and marital status have no measurable affect 
on over-education in current employment.  One might expect that this effect is different for 
women than for men.  However, our sample is not large enough to meaningfully interact 
family commitment variables with gender.  
High debt commitments (i.e. debts in excess of £1000 upon leaving Newcastle) raise 
the probability of being over-educated for one’s first job by 14%.  This is perhaps because 
debt places pressure on graduates to find some work immediately, and thereby forcing them 
into jobs for which they are over-educated.  Other forms of financial support, grants and 
company sponsorship played no discernible impact on the propensity to find suitable 
employment, and therefore we did not includ these variables in our final specifications. 
We also model the employment-education outcomes jointly as two dependent binary 
choices in which each outcome depends on the usual list of regressors and is affected through 
the error structure by the other outcome.  The results of the bivariate probit equations are 
reported in Table 5.  The table displays the coefficient and standard errors for first 
employment in column 1 and current employment in column 2.  We find that the coefficients 
in the probit models (see Table 1B in Appendix B) of over-education and the bivariate model 
are very similar in magnitude and significance.  The rho term displayed at the bottom of the 
table shows that there is a statistically significant correlation coefficient between the 
unobservables in the over-education equations. 
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5.2  The impact of over-education on wages 
 
One of the key questions of this literature is whether the over-educated earn less than their 
peers who have jobs commensurate with their education.  Human capital theory assumes that 
individuals are paid their marginal product, which is determined by their human capital rather 
than the characteristics of their job.  However, if a firm cannot use an individual’s education, 
then an individual’s productivity may crucially depend on the requirements of their job.  If 
this is the case, then the educational requirements needed to do the job should be included in 
the human capital wage equation.  
This section focuses on the relationship between over-education and wages as 
measured using log of real annual wages as the dependent variable.  The Newcastle Alumni 
Survey groups annual wages into 20 categories from less than £2000 to above £70,000.  
Since graduates started first jobs at various different times deflating the interval wage 
variable produces a continuous wage variable, hence estimation by OLS is appropriate in the 
case of first employment.  However, for current employment, the interval-based dependent 
wage variable is preserved and we use these ranges to perform maximum likelihood 
estimation due to Stewart (1983).  The explanatory variables used in the analysis of wages are 
separated in the tables under the following headings:  gender, occupation, faculty, class of 
degree, qualifications obtained post Newcastle, sector, firm size, employment characteristics, 
over-education variable(s), and the selectivity term(s) in the Treatment effects models.  In 
addition, training and years of experience are included in the analysis of current wages12.  
The tables display coefficients and robust standard errors, and at the bottom sample sizes and 
R-squared estimates are presented.  
Table 6 allows us to examine the effect of over-education on wages in first 
employment.  Specification I reports the simple OLS estimate of the effect of over-education 
on wages.  Specification II reports the IV estimate where the probit model for over-educated 
in the first job from Table 4 specification I is used to generate a predicted value for over-
education.  Lastly, specification III presents the results of the treatment effects model where 
the same probit model is used to generate the selection term, lambda13. 
                                                           
12 We estimated the same wage equations excluding sector and occupation, and including one and excluding the 
other.  The estimates of one categorical variable were largely unaffected by the inclusion or exclusion of the 
other.  On the other hand, the exclusion of sector changed the magnitude of the coefficients on firm size, 
therefore its inclusion was necessary to guard against model misspecification. 
13 The instrumental variables used for first employment are: regional mobility (relocate for this job, relocate for 
this job interacted with female); family commitments (partner prior to first job, child prior to first job); and debt 
commitments. 
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With respect to first employment, Table 6 shows that the estimated pay penalty to 
over-education is 18% under both OLS and IV estimation techniques (specifications I and II 
respectively).  When we correct for endogeneity using the treatment effects method 
(specification III) the selectivity term is statistically insignificant.  Therefore, according to 
our analysis, over-education in first employment is a random phenomenon generating a pay 
penalty of 18%.   
Examining the other determinants of wages in the first job, before looking at the 
effect of over-education in current employment, we observe several interesting findings. 
Firstly, women earn on average 14% less than men regardless of qualifications, occupation, 
sector, employment characteristics or job match.  Managers, professionals and associate 
professionals tend to earn significantly more than other occupations.  Graduates in arts and 
humanities earn approximately 24% less than in other faculties.  Class of degree and higher 
degrees are not statistically significant.  Graduates working in the education sector tend to 
earn more than those working in other sectors, perhaps due to the fact that starting salaries for 
teachers are relatively good.  Small firm size reduces wages quite significantly.  Part-time 
status and self-employment are not statistically significant. 
Table 7 presents the effect of over-education on wages in current employment.  Four 
wage specifications are set out.  An over-education dummy is included in the simple OLS 
wage regression in specification I.  The IV estimation is presented in specification II where 
the over-education variable is generated from the probit where no account is taken of over-
education in the first job (i.e. specification II, Table 4).  Specification III reports the treatment 
effects model, where the selectivity term is derived from the same probit model as before14.  
Finally, specification IV presents an alternative treatment effects model where the over-
education terms in first and current employment are included and two associated selection 
terms calculated from the bivariate probit model are used to correct for sample selection.    
In current employment, the effects of over-education are much more serious than in 
first employment.  According to our OLS estimate, the pay penalty associated with over-
education stands at 30%, that is 12 percentage points higher than in first employment.  In 
contrast, the pay penalty associated with over-education fall to 17% using the IV estimation 
technique.  However, using the Heckman Selection approach, the estimate on over-education 
rises to –87% and –81% in specifications III and IV respectively.  This figure is almost treble 
the estimate produced using OLS.  Moreover, the selection term with respect to over-
                                                           
14  The instrumental variables used for current employment are:  regional mobility (relocate for this job, relocate 
for this job interacted with female). 
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education in current employment is statistically significant in specifications III and IV.  These 
results indicate that the OLS estimate of the impact of over-education is biased downwards 
and the effects of over-education on wages are much larger than simple OLS estimates would 
suggest.  We also re-ran specification III using a probit model for over-education in the 
current job that included a dummy variable for over-education in the first job.  Our main 
conclusions did not change.  These results suggest that the over-education process may be 
endogenous to the determination of wages.  
The rise in the pay penalty in going from OLS to Heckman selection estimates is 
consistent with the returns to education literature which control for the potential endogeneity 
of education.  In these studies, the general result is that the rate of return to education rises 
when education is instrumented.  According to Harmon and Walker (1997), using the GHS 
for the UK, the OLS rate of return associated with leaving school at the age of 20 is 28% 
higher than the return associated with leaving at age 15, for men.  These results are 
symmetric with our OLS estimates which suggest that the pay penalty associated with the 
under utilisation of a degree is 30%.  In other words, there are no returns to surplus education.  
In addition, using the Heckman selection method and an ordered probit, Harmon and Walker 
(1997) find that the rate of return to schooling for men who leave school at the age of 20 is 
between 68-80% more than those who leave at 15.  Under the same specification, Harmon 
and Walker show that men who leave education after the age of 21 earn between 88-102% 
more than those who leave at the age of 15.  Their results, taken together with ours, suggest 
that there is no return whatsoever associated with over-education whether modelled using 
OLS or Heckman selection.  Therefore we suggest that it is fully consistent to find symmetry 
between the rate of return to education and the pay penalty associated with the under 
utilisation of education. 
Before examining the tests to check the validity of our instrumental variables, we 
briefly look at the other determinants of wages in current employment.  Right across our four 
specifications, women earn between 20-24% less than their male counterparts.  Managers 
earn more than other occupational groups including professionals and associate professionals. 
Graduates in arts/humanities and education earn significantly less in comparison with other 
disciplines.  In specification I, first and upper second class degrees earn more than lower 
degrees.  However, upon conditioning for selection into over-education, degree class is no 
longer statistically significant.  This suggests that the effect of degree class is accumulated 
into the over-education variable, and therefore does not directly effect wages.  Furthermore, 
once we control for selection into over-education there are no returns to a postgraduate 
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qualification.  Our early results showed that individuals with a postgraduate degree were 
more likely to get a graduate level job.  Sector of employment makes a significant difference 
with graduates working in the commerce sector earning between 46-52% more than in other 
sectors.  Firm size is an important determinant of wages with graduates working in larger 
firms earning significantly more than those working in small firms.  There is also a higher 
return to entrepreneurial skills with our estimates on the self-employment differential being 
approximately 23%.  As expected, part-time status reduces wages.  Training is not 
statistically significant.  However, experience is important and follows in the usual U-shape 
pattern.  In the graduate labour market there is no pay penalty associated with duration of 
unemployment. 
Bound et al. (1995) drew attention to the importance of the correlation between the 
instruments and over-education.  If this correlation is too weak, and at the same time the 
instruments are not completely orthogonal to the earnings residual, the IV-estimate might be 
inconsistent.  In finite samples, IV is biased in the same direction as OLS and the magnitude 
of the bias increasing as the R-squared between the instruments and over-education 
approaches zero.  Bound et al. (1995) suggest that the partial R-squared and the F statistic of 
the identifying instruments in the first-stage estimation be reported as useful indicators of the 
correlation between the excluded (or identifying) instruments and over-education.  The F 
statistic on the excluded instruments needs to indicate statistical significance.  For first 
employment, the F statistic on the excluded instruments in the first stage over-education 
equation is 7.69 and the partial R squared from regressing over-education against our 
instruments once common exogenous variables have been partialled out, has a value of 
0.05515.  The corresponding results for current employment give an F statistic of 2.84 and a 
partial R squared value of 0.009816.  While we are concerned about the low F statistic 
associated with current employment, these results compare favourably with the criteria 
suggested by Bound et al. (1995) and suggest that the instruments were legitimate and the 
specification was not subject to finite sample bias. 
Also, we use the familiar Hausman t-test for the endogeneity of over-education and 
wages.  Simply put, this tests whether the IV estimate of the over-education dummy differs 
significantly from the OLS estimate.  The version of the Hausman test statistic that we use is 
obtained by adding the first stage residuals to an OLS estimate of the wage equation, and 
                                                           
15 On advice from Professor Bound the OLS model rather than the probit model was used to estimate the first-
stage equations. 
16 It is important to note that in our first-stage equation no account was taken of over-education in the first job. 
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using t for the residual coefficients being equal to zero (see Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, 
pp.236-242).  For first employment, the Hausman test produces a t statistic of 2.103 (using 
probit in the first stage of the IV estimation rather than OLS).  These results reject the 
hypothesis that wages in first employment are not adequately modelled by OLS.  Therefore, 
IV estimation is necessary to produce a consistent estimator of over-education in first 
employment.  The corresponding results for current employment give a t-test on the 
coefficient of the residual of 2.246 (using probit in the first stage of the IV estimation rather 
than OLS).  Again these results suggest that OLS is not appropriate. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Using data from Newcastle Alumni Survey this paper focuses on the incidence and 
consequences of over-education in the UK graduate labour market.  The results reported in 
this paper suggest that 42% of graduates entered non-graduate jobs upon leaving university.  
In current employment 22% are still in jobs for which a degree is not necessary to do the 
work.  These findings are in line with recent contributions to the literature based on other UK 
data.  
The primary motivation of this paper was to examine the consequences of modelling 
the over-education process endogenously with the determination of wages.  We find that 
women are no more likely than men to be over-educated either in their first or current jobs.  
Arts/humanities or languages graduates are more likely to be over-educated than others, a fact 
that is wholly in line with the view that graduates with less vocationally-oriented 
qualifications are more likely to be overqualified.  We also find some evidence that higher 
class degrees place graduates at the front of the queue of good jobs with third and pass 
degrees moving graduates down the occupational ladder.  Similarly, it is an advantage to have 
post-graduate qualifications.  However, on-the-job experience and training have little 
influence on the probability of being over-educated.  Moreover, graduates who are initially 
overeducated generally find it more difficult to enter graduate level jobs later.  These results 
seem to suggest that over-education may be a long-term or even a permanent state rather than 
a temporary phenomenon.  This may give support to the hypothesis that the overeducated are 
in some way less able than those who have jobs commensurate with their qualifications.  It 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 26
also seems to contradict the hypothesis that graduates may be temporarily overeducated due 
to a bad match or that they are substituting education for other forms of human capital which 
they lack.   
Independent of job characteristics or education obtained, we also consider a range of 
labour market rigidities that may play an important role in the determinants of over-
education.  Regional mobility plays a significant role in allocating graduates to good jobs 
with graduates who relocate more likely to find work commensurate with their qualifications.  
Reflecting the greater responsibility young parents bear, students with family commitments 
are more likely to find graduate-level jobs than those without families.  In contrast, graduates 
bearing high financial debt commitments upon leaving Newcastle have poor prospects in 
terms of employment-education match than their better off peers.  Numerous studies have 
shown that financial circumstances have a negative affect on the probability of entering 
university in the first place, and now we find that financial circumstances also reduce the 
probability of using that education later at work. 
Moreover, we find that there is a substantial pay penalty associated with over-
education and that penalty is much more severe in current than in first employment.  The 
selectivity-corrected estimates of the pay penalty associated with over-education indicate the 
presence of a large and positive (less negative) bias in the least-squares estimate of the over-
education wage relationship.  Therefore, estimates which do not take account of over-
education endogeneity under-estimate the negative implications which education-
employment mismatch has on the wages of graduates. 
There are a number of reasons why policy makers should be concerned about over-
education especially in a time when there is a rising shortage of highly skilled labour.  Firstly, 
if a graduate ends up in a job that could be done without a degree, then there is a huge waste 
of tax payers’ money.  Secondly, if individuals leave university inadequately trained for the 
labour market, not only has tax payers’ money been wasted but firms may have to spend 
additional time and money re-training graduates.  In the meantime, many graduates will find 
themselves in lower-level jobs.   
Consequently, for future education policy over-education has at least four 
implications.  The first is that career-related qualifications should be closely linked to the 
changing requirements of the labour market.  This might be achieved by encouraging the 
involvement of organisations in the design of qualifications.  The second objective of policy 
might be to provide advice to students on the labour market relevance of various 
qualifications.  This way, aspiring students can make an informed career choice. 
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Thirdly, it is often argued that education yields non-monetary benefits to both the 
individual and society.  However, there is some evidence which suggests that graduates in 
jobs which under-value their qualifications tend not to receive much in the way of work 
satisfaction in comparison with those in graduate jobs (see Sloane et al., 1999).  And it is 
generally agreed that individuals undertake education for both monetary and non-monetary 
benefits, and a good education would combine the two. 
Finally, our analysis suggests that if debt has been incurred while at university, labour 
mobility will have important implications for the under-utilisation of education.  The policy 
areas to address these issues are in the structure of loans to students, especially the repayment 
components, and educating and encouraging students about the benefits of moving to take up 
good jobs. 
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Table 1:  Matching transition between first and current employment 
 
  Current job  
First job  Postgrad Degree Sub-degree No qual Total 
       
Postgraduate  79 7 4 3 93 
Degree  94 287 34 44 459 
Sub-degree  19 58 32 10 119 
No qualifications  44 119 38 58 259 
       
Total  236 471 108 115 930 
 
Source:  Newcastle Alumni Survey 
 
 
Table 2:  Distribution of qualifications required to actually do work 
 
 Current job First job 
 N % Cum. % N % Cum. % 
       
Post-graduate qualification 394 28 28 236 17 17 
Degree 698 50 78 577 41 58 
Sub-degree qualification 216 15 94 283 20 78 
No qualifications 86 6 100 304 22 100 
       
Total 1394 100  1400 100  
 
Source:  Newcastle Alumni Survey.  Answers to question 33 of the survey. 
 
 
Table 3:  Distribution of qualification required for entering work 
 
 Current job First job 
 N % Cum. % N % Cum. % 
       
Post-graduate qualification 355 26 26 211 15 15 
Degree 730 53 78 730 52 67 
Sub-degree qualification 148 11 89 164 12 78 
No qualifications 154 11 100 303 22 100 
       
Total 1387 100  1408 100  
 
Source:  Newcastle Alumni Survey.  Answers to question 32 of the survey. 
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Table 4:  The determinants of over-education – probit model 
I, First II, Current III, Current 
dF/dx Std. Err. dF/dx Std. Err. dF/dx Std. Err. 
Gender       
Female 0.015 0.06 0.016 0.036 0.013 0.030 
Faculty - Engineering & technology       
Agric, science 0.078 0.077 0.086* 0.053 0.074* 0.046 
Admin, bus, soc sc, prof'al, voc'al subjects -0.087 0.077 0.007 0.047 0.022 0.044 
languages -0.162 0.116 0.170* 0.126 0.177* 0.119 
Arts & humanities 0.045 0.103 0.152** 0.072 0.158** 0.071 
Education -0.399** 0.051 -0.079 0.051 0.017 0.097 
Class of degree - default Pass/Third       
First class -0.186* 0.101 -0.094* 0.036 -0.066 0.030 
Second upper -0.003 0.09 -0.078* 0.041 -0.068* 0.034 
Second lower 0.022 0.088 -0.103** 0.042 -0.094** 0.035 
Qualifications       
Professional qualification -0.031 0.05 -0.014 0.029 -0.011 0.025 
Postgraduate degree -0.053 0.051 -0.098** 0.037 -0.077** 0.033 
Employment characteristics       
Part-time -0.05 0.064 0.091* 0.057 0.140** 0.059 
Self-employed -0.13 0.092 0.004 0.052 -0.014 0.041 
Occupation - default (all the others)       
Manager -0.126 0.106 -0.091** 0.032 -0.085** 0.024 
Professional  -0.422** 0.053 -0.200** 0.037 -0.158** 0.033 
Associate prof -0.288** 0.056 -0.082** 0.031 -0.062** 0.027 
Sector - default education       
Public admin 0.374** 0.087 0.031 0.068 0.023 0.056 
Industry incl public utilities 0.378** 0.091 0.050 0.063 0.026 0.051 
Commerce 0.525** 0.066 0.150** 0.084 0.122* 0.073 
Self-regulating prof 0.112 0.127 -0.024 0.067 -0.011 0.057 
Other 0.447** 0.081 0.094 0.074 0.047 0.058 
Firm size - default <25       
25-99 employees -0.162** 0.065 -0.053 0.036 -0.057* 0.028 
100-499 employees -0.146** 0.068 -0.043 0.034 -0.051* 0.027 
>500 employees -0.210** 0.061 0.026 0.043 0.000 0.034 
On-the-job experience (Years)       
Training   -0.025 0.031 -0.012 0.025 
Age   0.007 0.026 0.012 0.023 
Experience    0.007 0.027 0.005 0.025 
Experience squared   -0.001** 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 
Unemployment    0.000 0.029 -0.011 0.026 
Mobility       
Relocate for this job -0.222** 0.058 0.066* 0.042 0.074** 0.040 
Relocate for this job* female -0.188* 0.101 -0.130** 0.021 -0.101** 0.017 
Family commitments       
Partner prior to first job -0.04 0.081     
Child prior to first job -0.111* 0.063     
Partner    -0.002 0.032 0.007 0.026 
Child (0,1)   -0.022 0.040 0.002 0.033 
Debt commitments       
Debts>1000 0.141** 0.059     
Cohort effects       
Participation rate 0.666 1.889     
Unemployment rate -0.112 1.331     
Year of grad (1,2..) -0.002 0.008     
First job match       
Over-educated in first job     0.205** 0.034 
N  852 731  731 
Log likelihood     -389.981 -278.829  -248.541 
 
Source:  Newcastle Alumni Survey. 
Note:  Dependent variable:  over-education.  Estimation is by Probit and marginal effects are presented.  Robust standard errors are reported.  
The data has been weighted using p weights in stata.  A single asterisks means that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level on a two-
tailed test (i.e. the t-statistic is greater than 1.64) and two asterisks that the coefficient is significant at the 5% level on a two-tailed test (i.e. 
the t-statistic is greater than 1.96).  
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Table 5:  The determinants of over-education – bivariate probit model 
I, First  II, Current  
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Gender     
Female 0.076 0.162 0.025 0.179 
Faculty - Engineering & technology     
Agric, science 0.074 0.189 0.474** 0.228 
Admin, bus, soc sc, prof'al, voc'al subjects -0.380* 0.217 0.120 0.248 
Languages -0.504 0.406 0.734* 0.403 
Arts & humanities -0.118 0.238 0.708** 0.274 
Education -1.716** 0.830 -0.360 1.067 
Class of degree - default Pass/Third     
First class -0.301 0.321 -0.601* 0.334 
Second upper 0.206 0.228 -0.391* 0.218 
Second lower 0.281 0.216 -0.490** 0.217 
Qualifications     
Professional qualification -0.211 0.133 -0.146 0.149 
Postgraduate degree -0.108 0.139 -0.512** 0.211 
Employment characteristics     
Part-time -0.177 0.211 0.477* 0.246 
Self-employed -0.253 0.543 -0.066 0.274 
Occupation - default (all the others)     
Manager -0.127 0.240 -0.581** 0.225 
Professional  -1.054** 0.177 -1.031** 0.201 
Associate prof -0.737** 0.166 -0.421** 0.180 
Sector - default education     
Public admin 1.065** 0.296 0.277 0.294 
Industry incl public utilities 0.939** 0.301 0.241 0.301 
Commerce 1.458** 0.314 0.705** 0.305 
Self-regulating prof 0.135 0.361 0.018 0.411 
Other 1.143** 0.300 0.403 0.282 
Firm size - default <25     
25-99 employees -0.363** 0.181 -0.356* 0.211 
100-499 employees -0.371** 0.186 -0.298 0.211 
>500 employees -0.679** 0.168 -0.026 0.179 
On-the-job experience (Years)    
Training   -0.030 0.145 
Age   0.037 0.101 
Experience    0.032 0.105 
Experience squared   -0.003** 0.001 
Unemployment    -0.049 0.112 
Mobility     
Relocate for this job -0.585** 0.159 0.232 0.162 
Relocate for this job* female -0.419 0.300 -1.090** 0.482 
Family commitments     
Partner prior to first job -0.007 0.270  
Child prior to first job -0.279* 0.167  
Partner    0.045 0.166 
Child (0,1)   -0.089 0.171 
Debt commitments     
Debts>1000 0.346** 0.137  
Cohort effects    
Participation rate 4.170 5.014  
Unemployment rate -2.578 3.639  
Year of grad (1,2..) -0.004 0.021  
Constant     
Constant -0.581 0.967 -1.211 2.173 
Disturbance correlation     
RHO(1,2) 0.666** 0.070   
N  731   
Log-likelihood  -578.510   
 
Source:  Newcastle Alumni Survey. 
Note:  Dependent variable is over-education.  Estimation is by bivariate probit.  Robust standard errors are reported.  A single asterisk means 
that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level  and two asterisks that the coefficient is significant at the 5% level.  Data is weighted. 
 31
Table 6:  The effect of over-education on wages in first employment 
 I, OLS II, Instrumental 
Variables 
III, Treat. Effects, 
Probit 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Gender       
Female -0.140** 0.066 -0.138** 0.066 -0.140** 0.066 
Faculty - Engineering & technology       
Agric, science -0.114 0.111 -0.089 0.111 -0.108 0.114 
Admin, bus, soc sc, prof'al, voc'al subjects -0.014 0.112 -0.039 0.112 -0.015 0.112 
Languages -0.216 0.157 -0.271* 0.160 -0.220 0.158 
Arts & humanities -0.255** 0.130 -0.237* 0.131 -0.249* 0.132 
Education -0.057 0.216 -0.255 0.254 -0.073 0.225 
Class of degree - default Pass/Third       
First class -0.044 0.173 -0.120 0.165 -0.057 0.170 
Second upper -0.092 0.111 -0.094 0.111 -0.092 0.111 
Second lower -0.108 0.110 -0.103 0.110 -0.107 0.111 
Qualifications       
Professional qualification 0.026 0.071 0.013 0.069 0.024 0.070 
Postgraduate degree 0.071 0.072 0.050 0.071 0.067 0.071 
Employment characteristics       
Self-employed 0.038 0.221 -0.011 0.225 0.029 0.222 
Part-time -0.234 0.143 -0.241* 0.146 -0.235 0.145 
Occupation - default (all the others)       
Manager 0.061 0.108 -0.016 0.113 0.045 0.115 
Professional  0.147 0.097 -0.031 0.128 0.112 0.119 
Associate prof 0.046 0.083 -0.074 0.120 0.021 0.105 
Sector - default education       
Public admin -0.360** 0.156 -0.228 0.182 -0.343** 0.169 
Industry incl public utilities -0.476** 0.156 -0.344* 0.180 -0.456** 0.169 
Commerce -0.340** 0.166 -0.132 0.219 -0.306 0.202 
Self-regulating prof -0.551** 0.181 -0.504** 0.180 -0.548** 0.181 
Other -0.355* 0.192 -0.203 0.230 -0.330 0.218 
Firm size - default <25       
25-99 employees 0.251** 0.107 0.167 0.114 0.239** 0.111 
100-499 employees 0.200* 0.103 0.131 0.100 0.190* 0.101 
>500 employees 0.208** 0.084 0.119 0.111 0.194** 0.097 
Over-education variable       
Over-education (0,1) -0.176** 0.061 -0.179** 0.085 -0.260 0.237 
Selectivity term       
Lambda     0.053 0.136 
Constant       
Constant 10.056** 0.232 10.008** 0.231 10.107** 0.245 
       
N  852  852  852 
R squared  0.175  0.174  0.175 
 
Source:  Newcastle Alumni Survey.   
Note:  Dependent variable:  log of real annual wages in first job (lrsalj1).  Estimation is by OLS , IV and Treatment effects models.  Robust 
standard errors are reported.  The probit models are from table 4, specifications 1 and 2.  The data is weighted. 
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Table 7:  The effect of over-education on wages in current employment  
 I II III IV 
Selection model None Probit Probit Bivariate Probit 
Earnings estimation method Stewart IV-Stewart Heckman-Stewart Heckman-midpoints 
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Gender         
Female -0.215** 0.042 -0.235** 0.047 -0.233** 0.045 -0.208** 0.084 
Faculty - Engineering & 
technology 
        
Agric, science 0.075 0.068 0.12 0.077 0.112* 0.068 0.103 0.116 
Admin, bus, soc sc, prof'al, voc'al  -0.042 0.086 -0.029 0.088 -0.055 0.085 -0.067 0.113 
Languages -0.155 0.107 -0.092 0.118 -0.084 0.117 -0.073 0.224 
Arts & humanities -0.163** 0.081 -0.093 0.098 -0.09 0.088 -0.075 0.142 
Education -0.426* 0.227 -0.494** 0.234 -0.438** 0.224 -0.456* 0.24 
Class of degree - default Pass/Third        
First class 0.240** 0.106 0.187 0.122 0.158 0.121 0.149 0.173 
Second upper 0.134* 0.073 0.091 0.083 0.085 0.084 0.1 0.121 
Second lower 0.086 0.071 0.032 0.085 0.022 0.086 0.035 0.122 
Qualifications         
Professional qualification -0.014 0.048 -0.025 0.049 -0.026 0.049 -0.023 0.075 
Postgraduate degree 0.175* 0.106 0.119 0.116 0.121 0.124 0.12 0.102 
Employment characteristics         
Self-employed 0.238* 0.132 0.232* 0.13 0.232* 0.132 0.222* 0.134 
Part-time -0.249** 0.09 -0.200* 0.105 -0.201** 0.091 -0.193 0.124 
Occupation - default (all the others)        
Manager 0.529** 0.124 0.495** 0.129 0.420** 0.155 0.392** 0.155 
Professional  0.326** 0.136 0.222 0.161 0.156 0.192 0.146 0.164 
Associate prof 0.240** 0.12 0.219* 0.123 0.136 0.151 0.133 0.137 
Sector - default education         
Public admin -0.04 0.069 -0.021 0.076 -0.041 0.07 -0.021 0.131 
Industry incl public utilities 0.033 0.075 0.059 0.079 0.036 0.075 0.053 0.135 
Commerce 0.464** 0.081 0.518** 0.095 0.524** 0.091 0.460** 0.156 
Self-regulating prof 0.116 0.086 0.099 0.09 0.094 0.085 0.093 0.165 
Other -0.003 0.098 0.042 0.111 0.031 0.105 0.046 0.138 
Firm size - default <25         
25-99 employees 0.200** 0.061 0.164** 0.069 0.159** 0.064 0.143 0.113 
100-499 employees 0.235** 0.065 0.201** 0.07 0.210** 0.066 0.193* 0.109 
>500 employees 0.272** 0.059 0.279** 0.061 0.285** 0.06 0.256** 0.106 
On-the-job experience (Years)         
Training 0.056 0.042 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.043 0.055 0.076 
Age -0.145* 0.081 -0.144* 0.078 -0.146* 0.082 -0.149** 0.049 
Experience  0.210** 0.081 0.217** 0.077 0.217** 0.08 0.210** 0.055 
Experience squared -0.001** 0 -0.002** 0 -0.002** 0 -0.002** 0.001 
Unemployment  0.112 0.083 0.114 0.082 0.118 0.083 0.120** 0.058 
Over-education variables (0,1)         
Current job -0.308** 0.068 -0.174** 0.078 -0.871** 0.357 -0.805** 0.347 
First job       -0.085 0.141 
Selectivity term         
Lambda-current job     0.334* 0.191 0.339* 0.206 
Lambda-first job       0.039 0.118 
Constant         
Constant 12.179** 1.641 11.960** 1.608 12.482** 1.6 11.994** 1.112 
        
N  731  731  731  731 
Log likelihood   -504.972  -509.423  -504.122   
R-squared        0.515 
 
Source:  Newcastle Alumni Survey.   
Note:  Dependent variable:  log real annual wages.  Estimation is by Stewart (1983) technique except where mid-point values and OLS have 
been used for the Treatment Effects model with bivariate probit estimation i.e. specification 4.  Robust standard errors are reported.  No 
account is taken of over-education in first job in 1,2 and 3.  The data is weighted. 
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Appendix A 
Table 1A:  Summary statistics 
 Summary Statistics 
 731 Observations 
Variable  Mean   Std. Dev. 
Log of wage variable      
First job  9.640   0.753 
Current job, mid-points  9.503   0.616 
Over-education      
First job  0.459   0.499 
Current job  0.196   0.397 
Gender      
Female  0.345   0.476 
Faculty      
Engineering & technology  0.189   0.392 
Agric, science  0.303   0.460 
Admin, bus, soc sc, prof'al, voc'al subjects  0.286   0.452 
Languages  0.032   0.175 
Arts & humanities  0.161   0.368 
Education  0.029   0.168 
Class of degree       
First class  0.082   0.274 
Second upper  0.386   0.487 
Second lower  0.411   0.492 
Third  0.060   0.238 
Pass  0.060   0.238 
Qualifications      
Professional qualification  0.437   0.496 
Postgraduate degree  0.405   0.491 
Employment characteristics      
Part-time first job  0.126   0.332 
Self-employed first job  0.037   0.189 
Part-time current job  0.103   0.304 
Self-employed current job  0.110   0.313 
Sector - first employment      
Public admin  0.208   0.407 
Education  0.141   0.349 
Industry incl public utilities  0.220   0.414 
Commerce  0.141   0.349 
Self-regulating prof  0.083   0.276 
Other  0.206   0.405 
Sector - current employment      
Public admin  0.183   0.387 
Education  0.176   0.381 
Industry incl public utilities  0.222   0.416 
Commerce  0.154   0.362 
Self-regulating prof  0.085   0.279 
Other  0.181   0.385 
Firm size - first employment      
<25 employees  0.238   0.426 
25-99 employees  0.231   0.422 
100-499 employees  0.194   0.396 
>500 employees  0.282   0.450 
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Table 1A:  (Concluded) Summary statistics 
 Summary Statistics 
 731 Observations 
Variable  Mean   Std. Dev. 
Firm size - current employment      
<25 employees  0.234   0.424 
25-99 employees  0.209   0.407 
100-499 employees  0.251   0.434 
>500 employees  0.282   0.450 
Occupation - first job      
Manager  0.057   0.232 
Professional   0.350   0.477 
Associate prof  0.260   0.439 
Other occupation  0.334   0.472 
Occupation - current job      
Manager  0.178   0.383 
Professional   0.393   0.489 
Associate prof  0.292   0.455 
Other occupation  0.137   0.344 
Labour market mobility       
Relocate for first job  0.301   0.459 
Relocate for first job* female  0.057   0.231 
Relocate for current job  0.268   0.443 
Relocate for first current* female  0.062   0.241 
Family commitments       
Partner prior to first job  0.089   0.284 
Child prior to first job  0.304   0.460 
Partner  0.719   0.450 
Child   0.479   0.500 
Debt commitments      
Debts>1000  0.231   0.421 
Cohort effects      
Participation rate  0.239   0.037 
Unemployment rate  0.061   0.022 
On-the-job experience - current job only      
Traning  0.659   0.474 
Age (years)  36.852   7.986 
Experience (years)  14.778   7.846 
Experience squared  279.862   242.660 
Unemployment (years)  0.379   1.139 
Source:  Newcastle Alumni Survey.  The data is weighted using a weights in stata. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table 1B:  The determinants of over-education – probit analysis 
1, First 2, Current 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Gender     
Female 0.037 0.151 0.077 0.166 
Faculty - Engineering & technology     
Agric, science 0.197 0.196 0.379* 0.212 
Admin, bus, soc sc, prof'al, voc'al subjects -0.223 0.201 0.035 0.221 
languages -0.438 0.342 0.614* 0.370 
Arts & humanities 0.114 0.258 0.594** 0.239 
Education -1.486** 0.404 -0.503 0.458 
Class of degree - default Pass/Third     
First class -0.504* 0.302 -0.614* 0.356 
Second upper -0.008 0.227 -0.393* 0.216 
Second lower 0.055 0.224 -0.516** 0.219 
Qualifications     
Professional qualification -0.08 0.128 -0.065 0.140 
Postgraduate degree -0.134 0.131 -0.496** 0.203 
Employment characteristics     
Part-time -0.129 0.165 0.371* 0.207 
Self-employed -0.346 0.257 0.019 0.246 
Occupation - default (all the others)     
Manager -0.334 0.296 -0.536** 0.220 
Professional  -1.178** 0.168 -1.076** 0.204 
Associate prof -0.783** 0.168 -0.438** 0.175 
Sector - default education     
Public admin 0.983** 0.256 0.141 0.293 
Industry incl public utilities 0.991** 0.266 0.226 0.263 
Commerce 1.535** 0.281 0.583** 0.275 
Self-regulating prof 0.282 0.319 -0.121 0.365 
Other 1.212** 0.266 0.395 0.274 
Firm size - default <25     
25-99 employees -0.426** 0.177 -0.281 0.208 
100-499 employees -0.381** 0.187 -0.217 0.183 
>500 employees -0.553** 0.168 0.120 0.193 
On-the-job experience (Years)     
Training   -0.119 0.141 
Age   0.036 0.124 
Experience    0.032 0.131 
Experience squared   -0.003** 0.001 
Unemployment    0.000 0.141 
Mobility     
Relocate for this job -0.587** 0.164 0.293* 0.176 
Relocate for this job* female -0.513* 0.308 -1.168** 0.340 
Family commitments     
Partner prior to first job -0.102 0.209   
Child prior to first job -0.285* 0.165   
Partner    -0.008 0.154 
Child (0,1)   -0.107 0.191 
Debt commitments     
Debts>1000 0.356** 0.149   
Cohort effects     
Participation rate 1.691 4.796   
Unemployment rate -0.285 3.379   
Year of grad (1,2..) -0.005 0.021   
Constant     
Constant -0.03 0.93 -1.102 2.708 
    
N  852  731 
Log likelihood  -389.981  -278.829 
 
Source:  Newcastle Alumni Survey.  
Note:   Dependent variable is over-education.  Estimation is by probit.  Robust standard errors are reported.  Data is weighted. 
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Appendix C 
 
Table 1C:  Qualification inflation in the requirement for work 
      
Panel A Qualification inflation       
Current job First job 
Levels N % Cum. % N % Cum. % 
      
0 1174 85 85 1265 91 91 
1 146 11 96 102 7 98 
2 45 3 99 22 2 100 
3 10 1 100 3 0 100 
      
Total 1375 100  1392 100  
      
Panel B Qualification deflation       
Current job First job 
Levels N % Cum. % N % Cum. % 
       
-3 2 0 0 …  …  …  
-2 21 2 2 43 3 3 
-1 115 8 10 174 13 16 
0 1237 90 100 1175 84 100 
      
Total 1375 100  1392 100  
 
Source:  Newcastle Alumni Survey.  Answers to questions 32 and 33 of the survey. 
Note:  Levels refer to the extent of qualification inflation.
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Table 2C:  Incidence of over-education by different categories of graduates 
Current job   First job 
Variable %   % 
    
Gender     
Female 35   40 
Male 65   57 
Faculty     
Engineering & technology 15   16 
Agric, science 36   35 
Admin, bus, soc sc, prof'al, voc'al subjects 24   28 
Languages 6   4 
Arts & humanities 19   16 
Education 1   1 
Class of degree     
First class 7   6 
Second upper 43   43 
Second lower 39   42 
Third 7   6 
Pass 4   4 
Qualifications post Newcastle     
Professional qualification 29   31 
Postgraduate degree 27   33 
Employment characteristics     
Part-time 14   17 
Self-employed 13   4 
Sector     
Public admin 15   16 
Education 5   3 
Industry incl public utilities 25   24 
Commerce 21   20 
Self-regulating prof 5   5 
Other 30   33 
Firm size     
<25 employees 28   30 
25-99 employees 13   16 
100-499 employees 23   16 
>500 employees 32   19 
Manager 14   6 
Occupation     
Professional  19   16 
Associate prof 33   21 
Other occupational groups 34   57 
Regional mobility     
Relocate for current job 31   15 
Relocate for current job*female 4   3 
Family commitments     
Partner prior to first job 4   5 
Child prior to first job 13   11 
Debt commitments     
Debts > stg£1001 29   32 
 
Source:  Newcastle Alumni Survey. 
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